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Abstract:  Those of us who have been involved in large engineering projects in large 
corporations are often surprised by the apparent lack of rationality or consistency in the 
way decisions are made. I propose a framework that can help us not only make sense of, 
but also influence what is happening during the decision processes in large projects. 
1. Introduction 
Discussion of decision making in large projects often assumes rational actors who attempt to optimise their 
choices in a predictable and controllable environment. If this assumption is correct, achieving success in these 
projects is accomplished by means of a thorough requirements capture, creation of the best technical design, and 
then implementation of that design. The experience of those involved in large projects is often very different. 
Engineers provide expert advice as to the best technical solution, and then stand by bemused as this solution is 
set aside, and the company chooses a different path simply because of the presence of a strong personality or 
because of “political” reasons that appear to be neither consistent nor rational—at least from an engineering 
perspective.  
One reason for this perplexity is that engineers often concentrate on the engineering part of the problem 
forgetting that the overall social and political environment of the engineering project is at least as important as its 
technical feasibility. Another reason lies in the nature of the environment itself: individuals inside and outside 
the organisation may have different objectives, personal agendas and requirements. The political interplay 
between them creates a series of complex social dynamics that do not necessarily align with an optimal technical 
solution. 
2. Proposed Framework  
We have developed a framework that can provide insight into the decision processes in large projects, and that 
can facilitate dialogue between the engineering perspective and the perspective of other players in the wider 
decision landscape. Two aspects of this framework are described below. 
  A simple “See-Think-Choose-Act” Model of a single decision process. 
  A dynamic systems view focusing on interactions between decisions. 
2.1. The See-Think-Choose-Act Model  
Figure 1 shows a simple conceptual model of 
the decision process. It is not prescriptive, but 
illustrates the phases we instinctively go 
through when we make decisions: we see a 
problem or opportunity; we think through the 
options for action; we choose a course of 
action, and we act as a consequence.  
The dynamics of the decision process—such as 
politics, misunderstandings, confidence (or lack 
thereof)—mean that the decision may 
“navigate” back and forth between the different 
phases. 
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Figure 1: The Basic See-Think-Choose-Act Model 
 2.2. Interactions between Decisions 
No decision is an island. Within a company, several layers 
of decision making occur at the same time, as illustrated in 
Figure 2. It is the same fundamental process, yet slightly 
different at each level of the organisation and in each 
circumstance—in a sense, we are talking about recognising 
a decision “fractal”. 
The dynamics driving network architecture decisions on 
which DSLAMs to use will be based on functionality, and 
their capacity to work with the rest of the network. 
The dynamics driving the procurement manager’s decision 
will be how good a price-performance deal he can get from 
the DSLAM vendor. 
The dynamics driving the Chief Technology Officer’s 
decision will be far more political, such as “how will this 
help me manage the Microsoft relationship?” 
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Figure 2: Layers of Decision Making  
in a Company 
Each of the above decisions will have their own logic, in a continuum from the purely technical at the “raw” 
engineering level, to the almost entirely political at the level of executive management.  
No company is an island. A company’s 
decisions interact with the decisions of 
its environment at many levels. Figure 3 
illustrates a portion of a decision system 
where several decisions interact at 
several levels and mutually influence 
each other, as shown by the four-
directional arrows. 
We thus have a complex dynamic system 
of decisions in which local decisions are 
influenced by, but also influence global 
decisions over several layers and across 
several domains.  
Technology standards
Act See
Think Choose
Act See
Think Choose
Act See
Think Choose
Act See
Think Choose
Act See
Think Choose
Regulatory Policy 
implementation
Common law, 
the economy
Company Strategy &
Policy formation
Adjacent Markets
Company Technology 
Strategy
Procurement
Decisions
Senior Executives of
other players in the market
Network Architecture 
Decisions
DSLAM Engineering
decisions
Act See
Think Choose
Act See
Think Choose
Act See
Think Choose
Act See
Think Choose
Act See
Think Choose
Suppliers’ DSLAM
Internal designers
Suppliers’
Senior Management
Suppliers’ DSLAM
Interface designers
Strategies of other 
players in the market
Act See
Think Choose
Press and 
Industry Analysts
Act See
Think Choose
Act See
Think Choose
Act See
Think Choose
Act See
Think Choose
Technology standards
Act See
Think Choose
Act See
Think Choose
Act See
Think Choose
Act See
Think Choose
Act See
Think Choose
Act See
Think Choose
Act See
Think Choose
Act See
Think Choose
Act See
Think Choose
Act See
Think Choose
Regulatory Policy 
implementation
Common law, 
the economy
Company Strategy &
Policy formation
Adjacent Markets
Company Technology 
Strategy
Procurement
Decisions
Senior Executives of
other players in the market
Network Architecture 
Decisions
DSLAM Engineering
decisions
Act See
Think Choose
Act See
Think Choose
Act See
Think Choose
Act See
Think Choose
Act See
Think Choose
Act See
Think Choose
Act See
Think Choose
Act See
Think Choose
Act See
Think Choose
Act See
Think Choose
Suppliers’ DSLAM
Internal designers
Suppliers’
Senior Management
Suppliers’ DSLAM
Interface designers
Strategies of other 
players in the market
Act See
Think Choose
Act See
Think Choose
Press and 
Industry Analysts
Act See
Think Choose
Act See
Think Choose
Act See
Think Choose
Act See
Think Choose
Act See
Think Choose
Act See
Think Choose
Act See
Think Choose
Act See
Think Choose
  
Figure 3: A part of the Wider Decision Environment 
3. Data Gathering 
3.1. Dynamics within the model 
Figure 4 illustrates data gathered on decisions made in one of 
BT’s international strategic programmes in 2004. Note that 
these are flows as perceived by the Programme Manager, who 
did not have visibility of all decisions at all stages of the 
decision cycle.  
Of interest here is the large number of times (17 instances 
observed) that a decision gets to the point of choice, only to go 
back either to the “See” stage or the “Think” stage. Of note 
also are the 4 instances when, after a decision has been “made”, 
the process cycles back either to make another choice, or to 
think about the choice again. Finally, it can be noted that the 
major part of management activity was observed to have taken 
place in the “Think” and “Choose” stages, as illustrated by the 
number of transitions between sub-stages (19 in each case).  
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Figure 4: Data gathered on decisions  
in a major programme Recent research has shown that the critical parts of the decision process—and where management attention is 
most needed—are in the “See” and “Act” stages.  
Not only does the initial framing of the decision determine the nature of the problem that is defined as needing to 
be solved by the rest of the decision process [1], [2], but also research in the last decade suggests that the choice 
is made intuitively before the “Think” stage (e.g. Damasio’s Somatic Marker Hypothesis [3]). For Klein [4] and 
Weick [5], the “Think” and “Choose” phases of decision are little more than a process of creating the “story” 
that will justify to third parties a decision that has already been made intuitively in the “See” phase 
Ertel [6] among others has described the way managers focus on getting to an agreed negotiated settlement (or 
decision) which then fails when implemented because the necessary conditions for successful implementation 
have not been taken into account. In their discussion of strategic decision processes in high-velocity 
environments, Bourgeois and Eisenhardt [7] place particular emphasis on putting in place the necessary structure 
and empowerment of local management to ensure effective execution of decision. 
The crucial point this brings out is that managers may be focusing on the wrong part of the decision process. 
Writing Business Cases and getting management teams to make official decisions are necessary, but this is not 
the part of the decision-making process that is fundamental to determining what choice is made. Nor does the 
fact that we have “got the Business Case approved by the board” mean that our goals will be achieved.  
If we wish to improve decision making, we should focus on the neglected area of “Seeing” (or framing) the 
decision, and building in the necessary parameters to ensure we “Act” effectively as a result of our choices.  
3.2. Dynamics between Layers of the Model 
The aim of the programme mentioned above was to redefine the strategy in a part of BT to maintain or increase 
revenues while reducing costs. The phenomenon observed was of cascading the decision process, particularly on 
costs savings, down the levels of the organisation.  
At the beginning of the process, the only decision made 
appears to have been to delegate the task of thinking how 
the top-level objectives could be achieved to lower levels 
of the organisation. 
It is when things got down to programme level that 
discussions began in earnest between the Programme 
Board and the Networks Organisation about the specifics 
of the amount of savings that could be achieved in what 
timescales. Significant time was spent in trying to 
understand exactly what the cost targets for the networks 
organisation should be. 
Only after that were specific actions agreed to drive 
through those cost savings. 
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Figure 5. Interactions between layers 
Based on Company Strategy, the Networks 
organisation had also initiated a series of 
cost savings programmes, some of which 
overlapped with the goals of the Business 
Unit Programme. 
It was at the sub-programme level that 
these two agendas came together in serious 
thought about what needed to be done. 
This situation generated frustration in the 
networks organisation, who said “we are 
already cutting costs”. It also generated 
frustration in the Programme, since the 
networks organisation pushed back 
forcefully on some of the top-down targets 
it wished to impose on the networks 
organisation. 
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Figure 6. Interactions between layers and organisations After significant time spent in dialogue as to what each party meant by cost savings, an external consultant 
recognised as an expert in the area was able to generate agreement as to what were the “reasonable” expected 
savings.  
The data above shows how the dynamics of several different decision processes interacted with each other to 
produce a result that was not to the full satisfaction of any one party, but was mediated via interaction between 
decision processes. In this particular instance, the dynamics reinforced the action of cost savings in networks, 
though the final targets set were less ambitious than had been foreseen in the Programme. As practicing 
managers know all too well, a less than ideal target may be required if it is to be agreed and accepted by several 
parties. 
Much research based on systems theory has been done on the interactions between individuals and between 
groups in organisations. Systems Dynamics is one discipline that has evolved to model these interactions [8]. 
Another fruitful discipline has been that of agent-based modelling, based on principles of Complexity Theory [9] 
Stacey [10] using the principles of Complexity Theory, suggests a perspective of self-organising interaction as a 
way of studying social systems, with its main focus not on the individuals or the groups, but on the process of 
interaction itself as a source of insight about what is going on.  
A fruitful avenue for future research is to apply the principles developed in the three areas of research above to 
the dynamics of the decisions as described in the data above.  
4. Conclusions 
The discussion above suggests the following conclusions. 
1.  Management practice as shown in the data gathered (and, up until recently, decision research) has 
focused on the generation of options and the moment of choice. More recent research suggests that 
bringing focus on the “See” and “Act” phases of a decision could significantly enhance both the 
understanding and effectiveness of decisions. 
2.  By considering the decision process in major projects as a system of interlocking decisions, we can gain 
a better understanding of the dynamics of “what is going on”, and thereby gain insight into how to 
influence the wider project using principles based on Systems Dynamics and Complexity Theory.  
3.  Combining conclusions 1 and 2 suggest that we can influence the dynamics of the wider project to 
maximum effect by focusing on the moments at these interconnections where crucial decisions are 
framed—at the beginning of the different decision processes at different levels and in different parts of 
the company.  
4.  Finally, realising that the decision in which we are involved is only one in a system of interlocking 
decisions, enables us to focus on the crucial period after the moment of choice, when the decision lives 
or dies by virtue of its successful implementation or otherwise in the wider environment.  
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